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13 | IMMIGRATION AND ETHNICITY IN THE AMERICAN CENTURY

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Any reckoning with the role of immigration and ethnicity in the American century ought to begin with some statistical measures. America in 1900 had a population of approximately 76 million. Into this society, in the years between 1880 and 1920, came about 24 million immigrants, a majority of whom arrived between 1900 and 1914. By 1914, a full third of Americans were either immigrants themselves or living in households with at least one immigrant parent. This calculation implies that immigrants were evenly distributed throughout the country, which of course they were not. Relatively few immigrants went to the South or the interior West. They concentrated themselves in urban and industrial areas in the northeast quadrant of the country (from the Mississippi River east and the Ohio River north) and on the West Coast. A true measure of their demographic weight in those areas can be gleaned from census reports on the ethnic composition of specific cities. The following figures are from the 1920 census, and they combine the first and second generations—the immigrants themselves and their children who were born in America: In Boston, New York, Chicago, and Milwaukee, they accounted for more than 70 percent of the total population; in Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Minneapolis, and San Francisco, more than 60 percent; and in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Seattle, more than 50 percent. A large majority of these immigrants, approximately 75 percent, were from Europe and increasingly from southern and eastern Europe. On the eve of World War I, Germans were still the single largest immigrant group, but their numbers along with those from Ireland and other countries from northwest Europe were being eclipsed by the cumulative weight of three to four million Italians, two million Russian and Polish Jews, two million Hungarians, approximately four million Slavs, and one million Lithuanians, Greeks, and Portuguese. Some states received significant numbers of non-European immigrants—Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos in California; Mexicans in California and the Southwest; and French

Canadians in New England—whose presence profoundly affected regional economies, politics, and culture.

A social phenomenon of this magnitude is bound to generate a mythology about the role of immigrants in the making of the American nation, and in this case it did. By mythology I do not mean views that are necessarily false, but rather views so powerful and so embedded in the national imagination that they come to have a life independent of actual experience; or, to put it another way, the myths themselves become a constitutive part of experience. The mythology that enveloped these immigrants from Europe is one familiar to us all. It portrays America as a land of freedom—religious, political, and economic. Here an immigrant could either practice his or her faith in ways denied in intolerant Europe or abandon religious faith altogether in favor of a “modern,” secular existence; here, an immigrant obeying the laws could quickly gain full citizenship rights and enjoy the political and social benefits that such rights conferred; here, economic opportunities abounded for anyone willing to work hard and show some pluck and adventuresomeness. Here a person could take charge of his or her own destiny. In some versions of this mythology, control over one’s destiny was thought to endow an individual with extraordinary freedom, either to cultivate a religious, ethnic, or regional culture that authorities in Europe had repressed or to construct a radically new way of living. But in the dominant versions of the mythology, it was expected that immigrants, once they breathed the intoxicating air of freedom in America, would choose to build new lives and become new men and new women. This mythology took shape long before the immigrants of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries arrived. The French-American farmer, Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, expressed it powerfully in his eighteenth-century musings on the American as a “new man” who had left “behind him all ancient prejudices and manners.” And it received a powerful boost in the late nineteenth century with the placement of the Statue of Liberty in New York harbor. Surely, there were few more resonant symbols of freedom anywhere in the world. Boatloads of weary and anxious Europeans, the “huddled masses” of Emma Lazarus’s imagination, raised their eyes—their first act in this new land of freedom—to gaze upon this monument to liberty.

And there was a great deal of freedom to be gained and enjoyed in America. For much of the nineteenth century, the United States was remarkably open to immigrants, accepting virtually anyone from any part of the globe as long as they were able to reach our shores. A steady procession of groups found in America refuge from political or religious oppression: the Puritans and Quakers in the seventeenth century, the Mennonites in the eighteenth, the German ’48ers in the nineteenth, and Russian Jewry in the early twentieth. The mythology of American freedom had often penetrated the imaginations of these and other groups before they had left homelands, becoming a factor in their decision to emigrate. Eastern European Jews spoke of America in the

years before Zionism became strong as the Promised Land, or as the *Goldene Medina*, the “golden land”; prospective Chinese immigrants talked excitedly among themselves about America as the *Gam Saan*, or “Gold Mountain.” “To these hopeful migrants,” Ronald Takaki writes, “America possessed an alluring boundlessness.” And many of those who were here (though few Chinese, as we shall soon see) enjoyed an exceptional freedom, which they used to practice their faith as they wished, or to make money and rise in the social order, or to reinvent themselves with new names, new occupations. One poor group of German-Jewish immigrants who arrived in the mid-nineteenth century built a glamorous (and lucrative) New York City empire of department stores by century’s end; Amadeo P. Giannini, the son of Italian immigrants, parlayed his savings from a San Francisco fruit and vegetable stand into the Bank of America, at one point the nation’s largest financial institution. Japanese immigrant farmers, specializing in fresh vegetables and fruits, generated one-tenth of California’s agricultural revenue by 1919. President John F. Kennedy’s grandfathers, meanwhile, themselves the children of penniless Irish immigrants, gained wealth and fame as powerful politicians in early-twentieth-century Boston. We could fill many pages with similar stories of poor immigrants who “made it”—and remade themselves—in America.

But, of course, this mythology, as do all mythologies, clouds as much as it reveals. Thanks to an extraordinary body of work produced by scholars of immigration and ethnicity since the 1960s, we now have a keen sense, in ways we did not before that time, of the many ways in which the actual experience of immigrants differed from the mythology that surrounds them. In virtually all periods of American history, we now know, a majority of immigrants were looking for work, not for a political or religious refuge. When the American economy was booming, they came; when it plunged into one of its many recessions, they stayed away. Many treated America as a place of sojourn, not as a place to make one’s home. These sojourners were not primarily interested in making themselves over into new men or women; rather they wanted to save enough money to return home and buy land in their native villages and gain stature in their local societies. Among some groups, rates of repatriation were remarkably high: 50 percent among Chinese in the mid-nineteenth century and 50 percent among Italians in the early twentieth century; as high as 80 percent among early-twentieth-century Balkan immigrants. Not everyone went home, of course; and among those who did, many would fail to achieve their dreams and would return a second or third time to the United States.

Most, after all, had not made fortunes in this country. The vast majorities had been unskilled or semiskilled workers laboring long hours for low wages. In the first decade of the twentieth century, immigrant men and their male children constituted 70 percent of the work force in fifteen of the nineteen leading U.S. industries. Their concentration was highest in industries where work was the most backbreaking. Immigrants built the nation’s railroads and

tunnels; mined its coal, iron ore, and other minerals; stoked its hot and sometimes deadly steel furnaces; and slaughtered and packed its meat in Chicago's putrid packinghouses. In 1909, first- and second-generation immigrants—especially Greeks, Italians, Japanese, and Mexicans—comprised 96 percent of the force that built and maintained the country's railroads. Of the 750,000 Slovaks who arrived in America before 1913, at least 600,000 headed for the coal mines and steel mills of western Pennsylvania.

Immigrants also performed "lighter" but no less arduous work. Jewish and Italian men and women predominated in the garment manufacturing shops of New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston. In 1900, French-Canadian immigrants and their children held one of every two jobs in New England's cotton textile industry. By 1920, the prosperity of California's rapidly growing agricultural industry depended primarily on Mexican and Filipino labor. In these industries, immigrant women and children, who worked for lower wages than men, formed a large part of the labor force. Few states restricted child labor. More than 25 percent of boys and 10 percent of girls aged 10 to 15 were "gainfully employed."

A fortunate minority within this vast immigrant labor force rose into the ranks of skilled laborers, where they were able to earn wages greater than what they would have earned in Europe. But skilled work was beyond the reach of most immigrants, who remained mired in poverty. Most working families required two or three wage earners to survive. Strained economic circumstances confined immigrant families to cramped and dilapidated living quarters. Many of them lived in two- or three-room apartments, with several sleeping in each room. The lack of windows allowed little light or air into these apartments, and few had their own toilets or running water. The population density of New York City's Lower East Side—the principal area of settlement for Jewish immigrants there—reached seven hundred per acre in 1900, a density greater than that of the poorest sections of Bombay, India. Overcrowding and poor sanitation resulted in high rates of deadly infectious diseases, especially diphtheria, typhoid fever, and pneumonia.

The American dream did not grip many of the immigrants who lived in these districts, either because they still clung to their hope of returning home or because their own living circumstances belied the myth that America rewarded those willing to work hard. Many immigrants, as a result, were disinclined to take up American ways, and some openly defied Americanization processes. This defiance took many forms—refusing to learn English or to send children to public, Americanizing schools; resisting an "American" work ethic imposed by hard-driving employers; obstructing the efforts of American-born social workers who, in the name of an "American" standard of hygiene, placed immigrant households under moral surveillance; celebrating one's Old World religion and culture, even when they conflicted with American religious and cultural practices; and embracing a socialist or anarchist ideology that depicted

America as Mammon, so given over to the worship of money and the exploitation of labor that nothing short of a revolution could achieve a just society.

To visit America during the years of peak immigration, then, was to enter a multicultural land, its cities in particular home to a dizzying array of peoples, cultures, and ideologies. This brazen "foreignness," in turn, provoked anger among the native born, leading to recurrent outbursts of nativism—an ideology that called on America to rid itself of aliens and restore power and authority to long-settled natives: not Indians, of course, but those who variously called themselves Protestant, British, Yankee, Know-Nothing, Anglo-Saxon, Nordic, the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, or just plain American or white. Many of these outbursts turned ugly, culminating in riots through foreign-born districts; the torching of immigrant churches and schools; the elaboration of frankly, and sometimes vicious, racist ideologies; and the implementation of punitive anti-immigrant legislation. The targets of the nativists varied across time and place. In the nineteenth century, they were Irish-Catholic immigrants, depicted both as a subhuman species unfit for habitation in America and as clever servants of the pope who had been sent to deny Americans their Protestant destiny. By the early twentieth century, nativist attention had shifted to the immigrants from eastern and southern Europe; the animus against Catholicism remained strong, now augmented by a vigorous anti-Semitism deployed against Russian Jews. The racial stigmatization of immigrant groups, meanwhile, had intensified, and the Italians and Jews, in particular, were seen to be carriers of anarchism, socialism, and other dangerous European ideologies.

Non-European immigrants were subject to some of the worst abuse. In 1790, the first Congress had passed a law restricting naturalization to immigrants who were free and white; this law meant that Asian and black immigrants could not become American citizens. While this law was amended in 1870 to exempt black immigrants from its provisions, the prohibition against Asian naturalization remained on the books and was enforced (with only a few exceptions here and there) until 1952. The Supreme Court resoundingly affirmed its constitutionality in 1922 and 1923. Here was powerful testimony to how much America wanted to be a European or white nation—a wish that rarely appears in the mythology described earlier.

We cannot dismiss these antiforeign impulses as a residue from an earlier time, when a young America was still trying to shake off its Old World origins, including, perhaps, a lingering desire for religious, racial, or national uniformity. Antiforeign impulses, ideologies, and legislation intensified as America approached and then crossed the threshold into its twentieth-century modernity. The first big blow came in 1882 in the form of Chinese exclusion. A total of 300,000 Chinese immigrants had come to America between 1850 and 1880, and this number would probably have grown to several million by the second decade of the twentieth century had the stream not been dammed. Imagine

how different America would have been in the twentieth century had the Chinese been allowed to take their place alongside the Germans, the Irish, the Italians, and the Jews as one of the nation's largest immigrant groups. But it was precisely this prospect of "Orientals" overrunning America that prompted Congress to pass a Chinese exclusion law and to keep it in place until 1943.

This law marked the beginning of a period of immigration restriction that gathered steam in the early years of the twentieth century, climaxed in the 1924 Immigration Restriction Act, and profoundly shaped American society—immigrants and nonimmigrants alike—through the 1960s. The 1924 act was stunningly successful, reducing annual immigration from outside the Western Hemisphere from approximately 1 million a year to 150,000, an 85-percent drop. The law affected southern and eastern European immigrants even more dramatically, as their annual arrivals fell from 750,000 (the annual prewar average) to a mere 18,500, a 97-percent decrease. The legislation effectively stopped the immigration of Italians and Jews, seen as two of the most racially objectionable and politically dangerous immigrant streams. While the barriers against Asian immigration hardly needed reinforcing, they were, as the law declared that any immigrant ineligible for naturalization was heretofore barred from entering the United States. Japan, in particular, regarded this provision as a humiliation; in domestic politics there, this American law weakened the influence of Western-oriented liberals and strengthened the hand of anti-Western and imperial-minded militarists. In such ways did the 1924 act push America and Japan down the road to war.

Increased Mexican immigration partially offset the loss of Europeans; bowing to pressure from agribusiness interests in the Southwest, Congress had refused to place a ceiling on immigration from Mexico or anywhere else in the Western Hemisphere. But the Mexican stream proved susceptible to administrative control, as government officials demonstrated in the 1930s when they forced 500,000 Mexican immigrants to return home, and again in the 1940s through a tightly controlled system of contract labor known as the "Bracero" program. The 1924 law, in combination with other measures, then, dramatically reduced the ability of foreigners to enter and to remain in America.

The movement for immigration restriction drew on several impulses. One was a Progressive desire to inject more rationality and order into the processes of receiving and Americanizing immigrants, processes that had reached such volume and unpredictability that they seemed to threaten the very integrity of the American nation. This desire manifested itself in the establishment of a federal Bureau of Immigration and related governmental institutions endowed with the power to supervise the arrival of immigrants, to identify certain groups of diseased, pauperized, and morally or politically questionable immigrants as unacceptable imports (and to deport them), and to set up passport and visa systems in foreign lands to control the immigrant flow at its point of origin. A second impulse driving immigration restriction was the belief that

immigrants had made the labor force too large and that wages and social mobility for American workers had suffered accordingly. Initially, this argument emerged most forcefully from the labor movement itself but, by the 1920s, corporations agreed that it was time for the massive influx of foreign labor to end.

A third impulse was racial: a concern that immigration was undermining the high quality of American "stock" by filling up the United States with races of lower intelligence, little capacity for self-government, and no discernible moral restraint. These immigrants were, in the eyes of the restrictionists, drinking too much, mixing promiscuously with other races (thus threatening America with mongrelization), and reproducing at unacceptably high rates. Racial concerns emerged first in connection with the Chinese and then the Japanese. But, in a move that many of us might regard as surprising, they had spread by the 1920s to immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. This is how one restrictionist congressman, Fred S. Purnell of Indiana, described the threat of eastern European Jews, Italians, Poles, and Greeks in the 1920s. "There is little or no similarity," Purnell declared, "between the clear-thinking, self-governing stocks that sired the American people and this stream of irresponsible and broken wreckage that is pouring into the lifeblood of America the social and political diseases of the Old World." On the floor of the House, Purnell quoted approvingly the words of a Dr. Ward, who claimed that Americans deceived themselves into believing that "we could change inferior beings into superior ones." Americans could not escape the laws of heredity, Ward argued. "We can not make a heavy horse into a trotter by keeping him in a racing stable. We can not make a well-bred dog out of a mongrel by teaching him tricks." The acts that Ward dismissed as "tricks" included the learning by immigrants of the Gettysburg Address and the Declaration of Independence.

Congressman J. Will Taylor of Tennessee, meanwhile, approvingly read to his colleagues a 1924 *Boston Herald* editorial warning that America was entering the same period of eugenic decline that had doomed Rome:

Rome had [mistaken] faith in the melting pot, as we have. It scorned the iron certainties of heredity, as we do. It lost its instinct for race preservation, as we have lost ours. It flooded itself with whatever people offered themselves from everywhere, as we have done. It forgot that men must be selected and bred as sacredly as cows and pigs and sheep, as we have not learned.

"Rome rapidly senilized and died," the editorial concluded, and so would the United States unless Congress took note of hereditarian principles and passed the 1924 restriction legislation.

Overwhelming numbers of congressmen and senators voted for this legislation. Many of them were not eugenicists, at least not in the extreme way of a Purnell or Taylor. Nonracial impulses motivated a significant number, who wanted to inject more order into immigrant processes, or who hoped to curtail the labor supply in the interests of raising the wages of American workers,

or who desired to control the immigrant population at a time when a vast state-sponsored Americanization program seemed too dangerous an undertaking. But very few were free of racialist thinking altogether. This was true even of a small, hardy band of liberal congressmen from midwestern and northeastern cities—Chicago, Detroit, New York, Providence—with heavily immigrant constituencies. Bravely they opposed the 1924 act and the racialist ideology it embodied. Led by Adolph Sabath of Chicago and Samuel Dickstein of New York, these congressmen mounted an eloquent defense of America's civic nationalist tradition, holding forth even after the act's passage had become a *fait accompli*. Thus, one of their band denounced the 1924 bill as "the worst kind of discrimination against a large class of individuals and absolutely opposed to our American ideas of equality and justice." Another declared that the stigmatization of certain European races as inferior would render his America unrecognizable: "This is not the America I belong to. That is not the America that I was brought up to love and worship. That is not the America that I want to be a part of."

But when discussion in the House shifted from European to Japanese immigrants, who were also to be excluded by the 1924 act, these liberals changed their tune. Sabath declared that he, Dickstein, and others were "all in favor of exclusion of the Japanese." Dickstein, himself, made the same point in dramatic fashion, interrupting an anti-Japanese tirade by a California congressman to "make it clear" that he shared the Californian's point of view. Only Fiorello LaGuardia showed some sympathy for Japanese plight, but Sabath was quick to cut him off and shut him up. Young and inexperienced, LaGuardia did not challenge Sabath's gag order.

Why did they do it? Sabath, Dickstein, and others evidently grasped how much a campaign against the Japanese might benefit immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. Whenever talk focused on the Japanese, the racial standing of the southern and eastern Europeans seemed to rise. The latter were no longer racially despised peoples, but simply Europeans, racially and culturally indistinguishable from the Germans, English, and Scandinavians. The designation of the Japanese and, by extension, all "yellow" people as the racial other had magically fused all Europeans into members of a single superior race. The eastern and southern Europeans no longer had to listen to charges that they were racially degenerate, mongrelized, and unassimilable. Denigrating the Japanese elevated the new immigrants and allowed them to claim identities that at least some of their leaders desperately wanted—as Americans, white Americans, Caucasians. When they saw how America's fondness for racial distinctions might benefit their people, Sabath, Dickstein, and their supporters made the fateful decision to play America's racial game.

The immigration act and the racial ideologies it embodied profoundly influenced immigrants, ethnics, and American society for forty years. Most obviously, the act dramatically reduced the number of immigrants; within twenty

years, America had ceased to be an immigrant society. The act shrank to insignificance the number of unwanted immigrants from eastern and southern Europe and from Japan. The annual quotas for eastern and southern Europeans decreed by the 1924 legislation were ridiculously small: 5,982 for Poles, 3,845 for Italians, 2,248 for Russians, 473 for Hungarians, and so on.

For immigrants already in America, the 1924 act, over the long term, exercised at least three kinds of influence. First, it intensified pressures to Americanize. Some of this pressure arose from demographic change. As the number of immigrants declined, so did knowledge of and access to Old World cultures. Meanwhile, within ethnic communities, a second generation more at home in the United States began emerging into leadership positions. But this pressure was more than demographic; it arose, too, from the stigma that had become attached to foreignness and the desire of immigrants and their children to hide markers of their ethnic identity, at least from public view. Numerous such markers lost their visibility in the two decades following immigration restriction. The number of foreign-language publications and Catholic national parishes plummeted; so, too, did the volume of conversations being conducted in some language other than English. If a group's Old World language survived into the second generation, by the third it was mostly gone. Cultural movements that today we would call multicultural—movements that insist on maintaining the integrity of particularist ethnic cultures even at the cost of keeping one's American identity or loyalty weak—went into eclipse.

During this time, many immigrants, from Hollywood stars seeking nationwide celebrity to Communists intent on revolution, Americanized their names. In Hollywood, Mladen Seklovich transformed himself into Karl Malden and Margarita Carmen Cansino reinvented herself as Rita Hayworth; Muni Weisenfreund became Paul Muni; Lucille Le Sueur became Joan Crawford and Julius Garfinkle became John Garfield; Bernie Schwartz metamorphosed into Tony Curtis while the jazz band leader Arthur Arshawsky converted himself to Artie Shaw. The Communist revolutionaries Stephanos Mesaros and Avro Halberg recreated themselves as Steve Nelson and Gus Hall, respectively, while their comrades Itzhak Granich and Saul Regenstreif became Mike Gold and Johnny Gates.

Hollywood filmmakers, meanwhile, many of them of eastern and southern European origin, were reluctant to reveal anything about their own ethnic identity in their movies. Thus, the Italian-born Frank Capra, arguably the most successful of the 1930s film directors, always cast Anglo-Saxon types—most notably Gary Cooper and Jimmy Stewart—as the virtuous men who, in his populist parables, stood up for the people against the vested interests and the cynics. Even for a scene in *Mr. Deeds Goes to Town*, a 1936 movie set in New York City, Capra chose to fill an unemployment line with farmers from the Midwest rather than the Italian and Jewish workers who, in real life, would have been the ones on New York City relief rolls. Exactly why Capra's midwest

farmers went to New York City for unemployment relief and how they got there were details that didn't seem to trouble Capra or any of the reviewers who loved this film. But they are details that should, if not trouble us, then at least catch our attention, for they signify a deep impulse on Capra's part to keep his own people, and thus his own identity, off the silver screen.

The second broad influence exercised by immigration restriction was indirect but no less significant: it made eastern and southern Europeans determined to increase their political influence in American society. As powerful as immigration restriction was as a tool in the hands of conservatives and eugenicists, it suffered from a crucial weakness. It could do nothing to stop the European immigrants who were already here from asserting their rights as Americans and pursuing political power. And this they began to do, often with a fury and dedication that took their opponents by surprise. Eastern and southern European immigrants started naturalizing and then voting in large numbers, making their voices count in politics, first in local elections and then in state and national ones. The 1928 Democratic nominee for the presidency, the Irish-Catholic governor of New York Alfred Smith, was their candidate, and Franklin D. Roosevelt was their president. These same ethnic Americans also played a crucial role in the labor movement and especially in the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the upstart labor federation founded in 1935 (for more on the CIO, see chapter 5 in this volume). The political mobilization that gathered in immigrant districts in the late 1920s and then allied itself with labor's resurgence in the 1930s was an extraordinary development, and it helped to secure the ascendancy of a liberal Democratic party for almost forty years. A liberal and egalitarian nationalism held this mobilization together, celebrating an America in which the rich did not live at the expense of the poor and in which religious or racial prejudice was not tolerated. World War II further strengthened this liberal nationalism and bolstered the claim of European immigrants and ethnics that America belonged to them as much as to anyone else. The Americanizing ethnics who participated in these movements came to believe that they not only had altered themselves but had also changed the America that the restrictionists had bequeathed to them. In some very important ways they had. Through their support for the New Deal, they had impressed on America the need for the government to mitigate the effects of untrammelled market capitalism, to contain disparities between the rich and the poor, and to care for those unable to help themselves. And through their enthusiastic support for the war against Hitler they forced a serious reexamination of racist ideologies abroad and at home. By 1945, a revulsion against religious and racial discrimination had spread to large sectors of the American population, as did a desire to identify and eradicate all prejudice.

For all these reasons, many ethnic Americans came to regard this New Deal era of the 1930s and 1940s, of depression and war, not only as a time of suffering and sacrifice but also as an era of advance. The prosperity of the post-

war years strengthened this conviction, as it put economic security, if not affluence, within their reach. This was the America that millions of European ethnic Americans eagerly embraced; this was the America that made Frank Capra a wealthy and famous man and engendered in him a lifelong love for his adopted land. These years, in other words, gave the mythology of America as a land of freedom and opportunity a great boost.

But, once again, to focus only on the mythology is to miss an important part of the story: of European ethnics not only becoming American but also becoming white and increasing their social distance from nonwhites. These Europeans ethnics were settling into a society still encoding its racialized notions into law and culture. We have already seen how the 1920s' Supreme Court upheld the 1790 law barring the naturalization of nonwhite immigrants and how the 1924 Congress passed into law a racialized program of immigration restriction. The 1920s were also a time when many state governments strengthened their laws against miscegenation. Virginia, for example, passed a law in 1924 prohibiting a white from marrying a black, Asian, American Indian, or "Malay." At the same time, it changed the definition of who counted as a black person from anyone who was at least one-sixteenth black to any individual possessing at least one black ancestor, no matter how remote. This statute stayed on the books until 1967. The liberal and labor movements of the 1930s and 1940s attacked aspects of the American racial order, protesting discrimination against racial minorities and insisting that they be given their full rights as Americans. But it is also true that numerous labor organizations and New Deal agencies reinscribed racism into their practices, if not their ideals. Many labor unions deferred to the wishes of their white majority, which did not want to see blacks—even those who were union members—gain access to "their" jobs. New Deal housing agencies, meanwhile, endorsed racialized real estate practices in northern cities; that meant giving racially mixed neighborhoods (as well as homogeneous black ones) low "grades," thereby denying people in those neighborhoods access to treasured federal loans, lowering the value of their property, and encouraging the white homeowners among them to flee to racially pure and high-value neighborhoods. And in World War II, as America was fighting a war to rid the world of racial prejudice, the government placed the West Coast Japanese-American population (110,000 people) into prison camps and constructed an army that not only segregated blacks from whites but, by and large, refused to let the "inferior" black servicemen fight. Virtually no black soldiers participated in the initial D-Day assaults on the Normandy beaches on June 6, 1944, a fact accurately reproduced by Steven Spielberg in his celebrated 1998 film, *Saving Private Ryan*. But there were hundreds of thousands of black servicemen stationed in Great Britain, many of them restive because the army had confined them to the "domestic" chores of building roads, ferrying supplies, and preparing meals for the white soldiers on the frontlines.

When we tell this story, we like to frame it in terms of racism's last stand; by the early 1950s, this tale goes, racism had been thoroughly delegitimized, its supporters outside the South, if they survived at all, driven underground. And, indeed, much evidence supports this view. The barriers against Asian immigration and naturalization began to fall in the 1940s and early 1950s, Truman desegregated the armed forces in 1948, and the Supreme Court rendered Jim Crow unconstitutional in 1954. But to tell the story in this way is to misrepresent the experience of the 1930s and 1940s, or, at least, to read too much of the future into the past. For if we recognize that the period from the mid-1920s to the mid-1940s were the critical years of European ethnic Americanization, then we can plausibly argue that the pressures working for racialization were as powerful as those working against it. In other words, as the civil rights movement was gathering steam in these years, America's commitment to a racialized society was being reinvigorated. Both processes unfolded simultaneously, and both shaped the Americanization experience. In this context, the European ethnics learned to value not only America's commitment to freedom but also America's commitment to whiteness. And this double education helps to explain what happened in numerous ethnic districts in northern cities in the postwar years, as residents there greeted African-American efforts to move into their neighborhoods with furious and often violent resistance: These European ethnics, as Tom Sugrue, Arnold Hirsch, and others have shown, had acquired whiteness and were determined to enjoy its privileges.

The persistence of this racialized sense of America is what makes the peak years of the civil rights movement, 1963 to 1968, a revolutionary moment in American society. While the movement could not eradicate entrenched racist attitudes overnight, it did tear down the legal edifice on which those attitudes had long depended. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed racial discrimination in all public and many private institutions. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 undermined the byzantine web of laws and practices that southern states had used for sixty years to keep blacks in those states from getting to the polls. The antiracist energy and idealism of the movement made itself felt, too, in immigration. The Immigration Act of 1965 finally overturned the odious 1924 law, erasing the remaining barriers against Asian immigrants and eliminating altogether the system of quotas based on national origins. No longer did American immigration law presume that certain races or nationalities were more desirable than others.

Although the 1965 Immigration Act did not reestablish the open immigration system that had prevailed through much of the nineteenth century, it did double the annual ceiling on total immigrants (from 150,000 to 300,000). Moreover, the law's generous provision for family reunification would eventually allow several hundred thousand more immigrants to enter a year. The law did introduce one significantly new method of restriction by imposing a ceiling—120,000 a year—on the number of immigrants from the

Western Hemisphere. This ceiling would intensify the problem of illegal immigration in the 1970s and 1980s, and increase suspicions of those groups, especially Mexicans and other Latinos, identified as the main sources of the illegal stream.

At least two other important changes affecting immigrants occurred in the 1960s. First, the civil rights revolution swept away the large body of state laws prohibiting individuals classified as white from marrying those classified as Negro or colored. The Supreme Court delivered the critical blow in 1967, declaring Virginia's 1924 law to be "so directly subversive of the principle of equality" that it was unconstitutional. States could no longer prevent Americans from crossing the color line for purposes of marriage. It took some time for this legal change to work its way through the culture, but by the 1980s and 1990s, the number of racial intermarriages had risen dramatically.

The other change occurred as much in culture as it did in law. Until 1965, the civil rights movement had strengthened the mythology of America, its adherents believing that the racist realities of American society could yet be overturned through mobilization around American ideals of freedom, equality, and opportunity. No figure more fully articulated and embraced these ideals than Martin Luther King, Jr., who, in an address to several hundred thousand protesters who had marched on Washington for "jobs and freedom" in August 1963, described how the Declaration of Independence still allowed him to dream that his "four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but the content of their character." But the vicious racism that civil rights workers encountered in the South had worn down their belief in King's dream; their trust in the federal government had also weakened as the FBI and other federal institutions seemed reluctant to ferret out and punish the South's Negro-haters. Then the violent protests of the black poor in northern cities, beginning with the Watts riot in 1965 and culminating in the devastating crescendo of violent protest that ripped across urban America in 1967 and 1968, focused attention on patterns of institutional racism that had long shaped housing, employment, and school practices in the urban North and West. An increasingly unpopular war in Vietnam further challenged the notion that the United States stood for freedom and equality.

As a result of these developments, growing numbers of Americans began depicting their society as one compromised by racism, inequality, and empire. The resurgence of black nationalism, first under the leadership of Malcolm X and then of secular black militants such as Stokely Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, and the Black Panther Bobby Seale, signified this anti-American turn. A wide variety of groups, from white and Latino radicals who celebrated the Black Panthers to white ethnics who loathed them, emulated the cultural style of black power. Encapsulated in the magnetic phrase, "Black is beautiful," this style demonstrated how any group that had been marked as different and as

marginal could shake off nagging feelings of inferiority and celebrate its particular identity or inheritance. Groups transfixed by the cultural assertiveness of black nationalists began to question the desirability of assimilation, preferring to tally up its costs. By the 1970s and 1980s a new ideology, multiculturalism, had arisen as an alternative to assimilation. It called on groups to invest their hopes and dreams in some identity—racial, ethnic, sexual—other than the now discredited nation.

While this ideology was strongest among the groups that had suffered most from discrimination, it also gained influence among those, such as the descendants of eastern and southern Europeans, who had enjoyed some success in America but who now rallied to the banner of the “unmeltable ethnics.” It also gained adherents among portions of the governing elite, especially among those located in federal agencies concerned with civil rights and social welfare and in philanthropic institutions, such as the Ford Foundation, that had responded to the racial crises of the 1960s by embracing the cause of racial equality. These elites did not revile the nation, but they believed that the treatment of minorities had severely compromised it; the state, as the representative of the nation, was thus obligated to compensate the aggrieved groups. These elites thus welcomed and helped to legitimate affirmative action policies, which required the government to identify those groups that had suffered the most from racial discrimination. By the 1970s, all federal agencies classified their employees as white, black, American Indian, Asian or Pacific Islander, and Hispanic; many private institutions soon followed suit. The last four groups in this pentagon of ethnoracial classification (plus women of all races) were the groups deemed worthy of affirmative action. By the 1980s, the government demanded that virtually all institutions, public and private, demonstrate their openness to these minorities. Lawsuits and loss of government contracts and subsidies loomed for any that failed to do so. Through such policies did the government hope to overcome the country’s long history of racial discrimination and to restore legitimacy to the nation’s egalitarian ideals.

Affirmative action’s creators saw their program as a way to address past wrongs and thus to strengthen the nation’s hold on its people; affirmative action, they believed, would spur assimilation. But the very process of identifying certain groups as deserving of assistance and of tying substantial benefits to membership in those groups strengthened the corporate identity of those groups. And within those groups arose leaders, influenced by the anti-American sentiments of the 1960s, who insisted that their followers cultivate their ethnic or racial identity at the expense of a national one. Thus one unintentional effect of affirmative action programs may well have been to weaken the government’s role in promoting assimilation and to fray further the American sense of “nation-ness.” The decline of nationalist feeling was not a development generated by domestic politics alone, however, as global economic

forces everywhere challenged the authority of governments and the integrity of nation-states.

The profound changes in 1960s law and culture together with convulsions in the international economy made possible the reemergence of America as an immigrant society and opened up the country to a variety of groups to whom it had long been closed. Whereas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries most immigrants had come from Europe, now most arrived either from Latin America or East and South Asia. Mexicans formed the largest group by far, as 2.7 million of them came to the United States between the early 1960s and 1990s. In these same years (1961–90), the country attracted almost a million Filipinos, 700,000 Cubans, 700,000 Chinese, 650,000 Koreans, 600,000 Vietnamese, 500,000 Dominicans, and 500,000 Indians. The sizes of these groups, with the exception of the Mexicans, are not as large in absolute terms as the sizes of the leading groups of the early-twentieth-century immigrants, nor do the immigrants as a whole represent as great a proportion of the American population as they once did. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that immigrants will once again become as large a presence as they were early in this century; for that to happen, the number currently coming a year, about one million, would have to quadruple to four million and maintain that level for a decade or more. On the other hand, this immigrant era is still under way, and millions of Latin Americans and Asians are still keen on coming to the United States. And while a restrictionist movement has coalesced in the last few years, the forces behind it have yet to demonstrate the broad base of support that would be required to force deep cuts in the immigrant stream. We can expect another ten to fifteen million immigrants before this era ends.

As in previous waves, the motives of many in this one are economic. Medical and agricultural advances in poor and developing countries the last fifty years have triggered large increases in population, increases not matched by their native economies’ ability to absorb the new people into well-paying jobs. Many of these immigrants, especially those arriving from Latin American countries, are from poor backgrounds, though generally not from the lowest strata in their societies. In the United States, they fill many of the poorest paying jobs. They make computer chips in Silicon Valley and garments in New York City sweatshops; pick the fruits and vegetables in California’s agricultural valleys; serve as stockers and cashiers in supermarkets, as busboys and waiters in fast food restaurants, and as housekeepers, kitchen help, laundry workers, and aides in hotels and hospitals. Finally, they provide the new urban rich in New York, Miami, Los Angeles, and elsewhere with a variety of personal services ranging from domestic service to landscaping to child care. While comparatively few of these jobs are in manufacturing, these immigrant workers suffer from many of the same problems as their early-twentieth-century predecessors who labored in steel mills, automobile plants, and textile mills. For the majority, wages are poor and vulnerability to the boss’s or supervisor’s

authority great; many have no protection from being laid off or fired, no recourse should they feel that they have been unfairly treated.

A significant portion of the immigrants, however, especially those coming from Asian countries, are not poor at all; they are highly trained professionals and managers who have decided that their skills will be more fully used and rewarded in the United States than at home. Thus the proportions of professionals and managers in the immigrant streams arriving from the Philippines, India, Taiwan, and Korea have regularly reached or exceeded 50 percent. This tendency represents a new departure in American immigrant history, for a professional immigrant stream of this magnitude appeared in none of the groups that came in the nineteenth or early twentieth century. It grows directly out of the 1965 law, which categorized professionals and managers as preferred immigrants. It reflects, too, the political and career frustration experienced by many of these professionals in their own societies. In the 1950s and early 1960s, professionals in countries like India were, on the whole, too committed to building their own nation to contemplate emigration, even if that commitment entailed accepting fewer career opportunities and a lower standard of living. These professionals partook of the nationalist euphoria engulfing their newly formed nations, and they fervently believed that their abilities and skills would enhance their nation's prosperity and prestige. As those expected results failed to materialize and as the task of building nations proved to be more arduous and corrupting than most had anticipated it would be, these elites lost their nationalist ardor. If they had become too settled to contemplate emigration themselves, their children felt differently and were more eager than their parents to fulfill personal dreams, even if that meant living permanently abroad. This reorientation made emigration to the United States a far more attractive proposition than it had been.

If the current immigrant stream contains a larger proportion of professionals than the last one, it may also contain a larger proportion of refugees. Russian Jews, we have noted, were the most notable example of refugees of the early twentieth century; their religious beliefs had put them in peril with czarist authorities. Among these Jews, moreover, and present in most other groups of southern and eastern European immigrants at the time, were radical émigrés—Socialists, anarchists, and later Communists—who had fled their countries because their *political* beliefs had cost them their jobs and their personal safety. Jail and even death awaited those who lingered too long at home. Today's refugees are also fleeing political, rather than religious, oppression, but they are not Socialists or Communists. To the contrary, they are in flight from Communist regimes, especially those in Cuba, Vietnam, China, and the former Soviet Union. Their loathing of Communist forms of rule has turned many into political conservatives and inflected ethnic politics with a strong right-wing presence—in sharp contrast to the left-wing influence that was so prominent a force in immigrant politics of the early twentieth century. Thus,

the most vivid political figure among the immigrants today is not some young Jewish woman or man in New York City stumping for socialism, but the equally fervent Cuban exile in Miami using powerful radio transmitters to saturate the Caribbean with anti-Castro broadsides.

Initially, the political refugees from Communist societies such as Cuba and Vietnam were drawn from the more advantaged sectors of their home societies, where their wealth and their connections with American business and government circles made them targets of the new Communist rulers; for these same reasons, American political authorities were eager to hustle these individuals to American safety. Possessing considerable human capital in the form of education or experience in running their own businesses, these refugees were well positioned to take advantage of opportunities in American society. Thus, many Cubans in south Florida and Vietnamese in Southern California and the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, have prospered from their time in America. But, in the case of both these groups, many of the immigrants who followed the pioneers—including the Cubans who participated in the so-called Mariel exodus in the early 1980s and the Hmong villagers who fled Communist Laos—did not bring the same skills or contacts with them and have had to endure a harsh poverty. Refugees fleeing right-wing regimes in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Haiti in the 1980s have also had a difficult immigrant experience, first because they faced an American government reluctant to grant them official status as refugees (in the government's eyes, the perils of life under right-wing regimes were not as great as those under Communist ones), and second because they too tended to be without economic resources. For all these reasons, the immigrants of today may well be a more diverse lot than they were early in the twentieth century, more varied in their countries of origin, in their economic background, and in their motives for coming.

Another important difference between the immigrants of today and those earlier in the century is that the former are much more likely to live in family units. This tendency, too, is encouraged by immigration law, which allows any immigrant to sponsor immediate family members—parents, siblings, and children—still living outside the United States. In this way, today's immigrants differ from the millions of Italians, Greeks, Slavs, and other southern and eastern Europeans who, in the early twentieth century, "sojourned" in the United States alone. In some respects, a family orientation spurs assimilation: the children in these families quickly become English speakers and are likely to be immersed in sports, music, clothing, and other aspects of American mass culture. On the other hand, political pressures to assimilate—those generated by American political authorities—are significantly less than they were earlier in the century, as multiculturalism, itself a virtual government policy in many areas where immigrants concentrate, encourages the newcomers to retain their native traditions. Despite a flurry of anti-immigrant agitation in the mid-1990s, the pressures on immigrants to Americanize and to shed stigmatized

Old World cultures are still not nearly as strong as they were in the second and third decades of the twentieth century. The comparative weakness of these political pressures allows immigrants to maintain a strong identity with their homelands without having to fear economic or political reprisals. Meanwhile, governments and political parties in the immigrants' homelands do more than their counterparts in the early twentieth century did to keep emigrants informed of and involved in political and social developments at home. Some foreign governments allow their emigrants to exercise citizenship rights; thus, Colombians in New York regularly participate in elections in Colombia, while New York Hasidim make two-day trips to Israel to vote when their participation is deemed to be critical to the outcome of parliamentary contests there. Among Colombians, it is even possible to run for office in a Colombian election and to serve as an elected Colombian official while living in New York City! These immigrants, like most others, participate in far-flung diasporas whose effective functioning is made possible by various foreign governments' diligent policies, the low cost and speed of international travel, and the instantaneous character of modern communication.

The non-European origins of many immigrants, the large number of professionals and political refugees among them, their family orientation, the ease of maintaining diasporic connections, and the American state's commitment to multicultural rather than assimilative policies are all features of this wave of immigration that distinguish it from the last. But how different the current immigrants' experience ultimately becomes may well depend on two other factors: their orientation to whiteness and their ability if not to prosper, at least to achieve economic security in America. The civil rights revolution of the 1960s mounted a stunning assault on the privileges of whiteness: in one area after another—the use of public accommodations, employment, housing, voting rights, immigration, marriage—the revolution undercut the legislative edifice that had long encoded white superiority, north and south, into law. This revolution transformed the field of immigration as much as any other, making possible, for the first time in the history of the American nation, an immigrant stream that was overwhelmingly nonwhite. At the same time, the revolution generated hopes that race would lose its salience as a source of division and friction in American society. Some signs, from the emergence of a dynamic black middle class and the racial integration of American celebrity culture to accelerating rates of intermarriage across various color lines, suggest that race is indeed declining in significance. The intermarriage data are particularly interesting in this regard. The 1990 census revealed that approximately half of Asian immigrants and about one-third of Latino immigrants aged 25 to 34 had married outside their immigrant group. In light of these statistics, it seems reasonable to suppose that rates of intermarriage among the children of Asian and Latino immigrants are even higher. We do know that the intermarriage rates among some groups, such as Japanese-American women, exceed 70 percent.

Rates of black-white intermarriage are far lower, but, by some measures, have risen dramatically since the 1960s; thus, the number of African Americans marrying whites has increased from less than 3 percent in 1970 to more than 12 percent in 1993. If we project these statistical trends fifty to one hundred years into the future, it is possible to imagine that America will become a "brown nation," one thoroughly hybridized and in which racial distinctions have lost most of their force. This would be a great achievement, should it come to pass, and the new immigrants will have played a pivotal role in bringing it about.

But there is a less sanguine way of reading these intermarriage statistics, and that is to stress that gap that has emerged between immigrant and African-American intermarriage rates. Thus Latino immigrants are almost three times and Asian immigrants more than four times as likely as African Americans to marry whites. Moreover, rates of intermarriage among Asians and African Americans and among Latinos and African Americans are so low that they are barely discernible. In this sense, the golf *wunderkind*, Tiger Woods, who is of mixed African-American and Asian ancestry, should be viewed not as the representative of a large group of similarly mixed people but rather as a striking exception. Blacks may simply have more catching up to do, and the 2000 census may show their rate of outmarriage converging with those of other non-European groups. But a familiar historical pattern may be reestablishing itself: blacks may find their opportunities for integration limited even as white Americans open their arms (literally, in the case of marriage) to nonblack immigrants. In this way, Asian and Latino immigrants may, at some point, come to define their Americanness in terms of being white or, at least, of not being black. Meanwhile, Afro-Caribbean immigrant parents from Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and other West Indian nations who have settled in New York and other eastern cities observe their children assimilating into an angry African-American youth culture, a tendency that many of these parents regard as injurious to their kids but which they feel powerless to resist. These patterns suggest that "whiteness" and "blackness" are still charged with meaning in 2000 America and may continue to structure patterns of immigrant assimilation well into the twenty-first century. If that happens, the civil rights revolution will come to be judged a failure, and the future will indeed come to resemble the past.

The large number of professionals in this immigrant stream and the success they have enjoyed should not be allowed to obscure the majority that labors in poorly paid manufacturing, agricultural, and service jobs. Many of these immigrants are determined to improve their lot, going to university at night, picking up second jobs as taxidriviers and doormen, saving money to start their own small garment shop or landscape service. Some will make it, just as did poor immigrants in the early twentieth century. America has always given opportunities to those with talent willing to work hard and lucky

enough to be blessed with good fortune. But the majority of immigrants will not succeed in this way; their hope of rising in the social order will depend more on collective than on individual struggle. Historically, immigrant groups have often developed their own institutions of collective self-help, and in associations of Korean grocers and Mexican contractors we see these patterns, so vital to economic success, being reproduced. But these have not been sufficient in the past to assist the ordinary wage earner, which is why labor unions have played an important role in enabling immigrants or their children to improve their economic condition.

The great labor breakthrough for the southern and eastern European ethnic workers came in the 1930s through the allied efforts of the CIO and the New Deal. It will take an effort of similar breadth and energy today to lift up today's immigrant poor, especially in areas, such as southern California, and among groups, such as Mexican Americans, in which patterns of impoverished immigrant wage-earning are most entrenched. The circumstances of these immigrant workers are made all the more vulnerable because of the nature of the global economy in which corporations have become adept at shifting investments and jobs from one country to another at lightning-like speed. In this economic setting, the power of any one state, the American one included, to influence economic trends is correspondingly reduced. So, too, is the ability of nationalism to function as an ideology of rights around which Americans might mobilize and sway public opinion to their side. It is thus hard to see how a labor movement the size and influence of the 1930s one might reappear. In an age in which socialism has been discredited and in which nationalism no longer exerts the same hold on the imagination of Americans, what ideology is capable of generating transethnic solidarity among immigrant workers? In this age of declining state power, to what authority will immigrants turn as they seek to reign in the power of global capital? How successfully the immigrant poor answer these questions will shape their fate as Americans. In the process they will determine whether the vaunted mythology of America as a land of freedom and opportunity survives into the twenty-first century or whether it comes to be seen as a quaint artifact of an earlier time, no longer relevant to our own.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

For overviews of American immigration, consult Roger Daniels, *Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life* (New York: Harper Collins, 1990); Leonard Dinnerstein, Roger L. Nichols, and David Reimers, *Natives and Strangers: A Multicultural History of America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Ronald Takaki, *A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America* (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1993). The best synthesis of the European immigration experience in the first half of this century is John Bodnar, *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America* (Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1985); for Latino and Asian immigration in the century's second half, consult Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, *Immigrant America: A Portrait*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Reed Ueda, *Postwar Immigrant America: A Social History* (Boston: Bedford, 1994); and David R. Reimers, *Still the Golden Door: The Third World Comes to America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). For a synthesis that places women and gender at the center of the immigrant experience, see Donna R. Gabaccia, *From the Other Side: Women, Gender, and Immigrant Life in the U.S., 1820–1990* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

The literature on individual immigrant groups is so vast that it cannot be included in a short bibliography. Those who seek such information should begin with Stephan Thernstrom, ed., *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1980); in addition to containing individual entries (with bibliographies) on every imaginable immigrant group, the encyclopedia contains invaluable thematic essays on many issues of concern to immigration scholars. This volume is less useful for contemporary immigration, so it should be supplemented with Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz, and Josh DeWind, eds., *The Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience* (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1999). See also Rudolph J. Vecoli, "Ethnicity and Immigration," in Stanley I. Kutler, ed., *Encyclopedia of the United States in the Twentieth Century*, Vol. 1 (New York: Scribner's, 1996), pp. 161–193. As for so many other topics, *The Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), is an indispensable source of statistical information on the numbers, origins, naturalization rates, and residential patterns of immigrants.

Gary Gerstle, "Liberty, Coercion, and the Making of Americans," *Journal of American History* 84 (September 1997): 524–558, traces the influence of American mythology on the work of American immigration historians. The classic work on nativism and immigration restriction is John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992), though it should be supplemented with Ian Haney López, *White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race* (New York: New York University Press, 1996). On European ethnics, labor, and the New Deal, consult Lizabeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919–1939* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Gary Gerstle, *Working-Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City, 1914–1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). On these groups' pursuit of whiteness, see Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); Thomas J. Sugrue, *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); and Arnold R. Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940–1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Consult Hugh Davis Graham, *The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) for a history of the legislative changes that accompanied the civil rights revolution. For thoughtful reflections on immigrants, citizenship, and nationalism in fin-de-siècle America, see the essays in Noah M. J. Pickus, ed., *Immigration and Citizenship in the 21st Century* (Lanham, Md.: Rowan & Littlefield, 1998). On immigrant workers in the postindustrial economy, consult Roger Waldinger, *Still the Promised City? African Americans and Immigrants in Postindustrial New York* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). For an example of late-twentieth-century nativism, see Peter Brimelow, *Alien Nation: Common Sense about America's Immigration Disaster* (New York: Random House, 1995).